AGNI-5: India’s MIRV-Enabled Missile and the Way Ahead

In March, India completed a year of successfully testing the Agni-V that would be carrying Multiple Independently targetable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs) under Mission Divyastra. This significant milestone showcases India’s commitment to advancing its missile technology and enhancing its defence capabilities against potential threats in the region. The Agni-V, with its long-range capabilities, can play a crucial role in deterrence strategy by providing India with a credible second-strike capability. India now has the Agni-V equipped with MIRV capabilities to maintain parity with China, which has emerged as a major national security threat in terms of military advancements.

The need for such technological advancements has been underscored by the evolving security dynamics in the wider Asia-Pacific region. China, which had initially struggled with its nuclear warhead miniaturisation technology process, has finally succeeded and made its Inter-Continental range Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) most of which are already MIRV capable, hence demonstrating a significant leap in its military prowess. This development not only enhances China’s strike potential but also poses a strategic challenge for India’s defence planners who are now compelled to continuously innovate and update their capabilities to ensure national security amidst rising geopolitical tensions.

Countries develop MIRV and multiple re-entry vehicles (MRVs) as a countermeasure against increasingly sophisticated ballistic missile defence systems deployed by adversaries. The technological advancements in missile design have led to innovations such as India’s MIRV-equipped Agni-V, which enhances the missile’s ability to maneuver and evade complex enemy air and missile defence mechanisms. By utilising multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles, the Agni-V provides greater strategic flexibility, allowing for the engagement of multiple targets simultaneously, thus overwhelming enemy defenses. India has rigorously tested the Agni-V missiles in both canister-launched and open configurations, ensuring comprehensive assessments of their performance in varied scenarios and providing greater launch flexibility.

The canister-launched variant of the missile is especially significant as it implies that the missile is not only capable of surviving enemy radars and surveillance mechanisms but also enhances the overall agility and quick response capabilities of India’s missile arsenal. Moreover, this adaptability is further complemented by the road and rail mobility of the missile systems, with the rail mobility specifically allowing for operational deployment from fixed positions, thereby strengthening the survivability of the missile systems while gaining an additional layer of strategic flexibility in response to evolving threats.

There are concerns that MIRVs would reduce the strategic balance in the region. However, China also has the same MIRV capabilities on its ICBM forces. Pakistan has also tested Ababeel missile with MIRV capabilities. India’s MIRV capability maintains the strategic stability rather than destabilising it by strengthening the ‘offence-offence’ balance.

In addition, the mission ‘Divyastra’ under which the missile underwent the test itself describes the missile as strategically stabilising as such ‘astras’ or weapons in the past were used following legal mechanisms and norms and the one using such weapons could not use them irresponsibly. Hence, the name of the mission itself strengthens India’s ‘no-first use’ doctrine by possessing capabilities for tit-for-tat response only.  If ‘punitive retaliation’ strategy has to be strengthened, India needs capabilities that could reach targets without any technological hindrances.

Such capabilities in the Indian context would strengthen India’s ‘no-first use’ doctrine as the fear of a ‘use them or lose them dilemma’ would be less. The fact that such missiles are capable of evading missile defence capabilities of adversaries and cause nuclear catastrophe, strengthens their survivability as counter-measures on missile systems improve their survivability vis-à-vis missile defence systems. Thus, India’s ‘no-first use’ nuclear doctrine is only strengthened and not weakened with the ability of the missile system to possess features and capabilities that could make it survivable and provide greater scope for a ‘counter-strike’ nuclear launch.  

As mentioned already, canister launched capability provides greater scope for these missiles to strengthen ‘no-first use’ doctrine with MIRV capabilities, as such capabilities reduce launch-time preparation of the missile system. However, mere possession of MIRV capabilities on its intercontinental range missiles is not enough. Such missiles would need greater intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities to be able to prevent accidental launches ,especially as our doctrine states a ‘no-first use.’

The missile system, along with technological advancements, boasts of India’s technological prowess for indigenous capabilities developed by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), providing India entry into the elite club of those countries possessing MIRV capabilities. However, continuous testing of such capabilities is required for operational readiness. India’s ‘credible minimum deterrence’ will be strengthened only when such capabilities are frequently tested with greater success rate so as to prove that the deterrence is credible.

MIRV capabilities of long-range missiles also ensure the accuracy of the missile to reach its target. Unlike conventional missile capabilities, nuclear-capable missiles require less accuracy for causing lethal impact. Hence, a missile that has advanced guidance systems, and is also able to evade missile defence systems could increase the accuracy of the missile that would have otherwise been intercepted. An un-intercepted missile is the initial stage of accuracy. Agni-V already possesses indigenous avionic systems and high accuracy sensor packages, and thus, MIRVs would only add strength to its advanced technologies to improve accuracy.

DRDO officials have maintained earlier that MIRV capabilities are meant for future missile technologies and not meant for Agni-V. Hence, Agni-V could be used as a technology demonstrator to test such capabilities for future advanced missile capabilities. For policy-makers, such capabilities on Agni-V would highlight the strategic imperatives of such capabilities. For instance, Pakistan tested MIRV capabilities on its Ababeel missile system; however, in future, as a deterrence against West Asia, it could MIRV its Shaheen-3 missile system with MIRVs.

Technological advancements in India’s missile capabilities would strengthen both its conventional as well as nuclear deterrence. This enhancement is crucial not only for national security but also for ensuring a robust defence posture in an increasingly volatile geopolitical landscape. If India has to become a strong power with advanced capabilities, there is a need to keep pace with advanced technologies for status in the global forum, technological prowess, and strategic deterrence both regionally and globally. Moreover, these advancements would enable India to assert itself more confidently on international platforms, fostering alliances and partnerships that align with its strategic interests. With a focus on indigenous development and research, India can not only enhance its missile technology but also contribute to global peace and stability, reflecting a commitment to secure and responsible power in a multipolar world.