India’s Withdrawl From Ayni Airbase
Brief By Debalina Ghoshal Download Brief Here
Recently, there were reports that India is no longer operating the air base at Tajikistan, the Ayni airbase, located 20 km from Afghanistan’s Wakhan Corridor near Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK) and China’s Xinjiang. India commenced renovating the base under an agreement with Tajikistan in 2002 to provide support to Afghanistan’s Northern Alliance during its fight with the Taliban. The lease was for twenty years, and in 2022, Tajikistan refused to extend the agreement. As a result, India commenced withdrawing its military forces from the Ayni military base. However, amid the criticisms of this withdrawal, some introspection on the reasons for the same and the future implications could help understand the scenario better. These reasons are drawn from activities and events taking place during similar timelines or a few years before 2022.
FACTORS THAT COULD FUEL INDIA’S EXIT FROM AYNI AIRBASE
One of the major reasons why there was a lackadaisical interest from Tajikistan to extend the arrangement was due to the China and Russian military presence in the region for strengthening their strategic foothold in Central Asia. Russia stations its largest overseas military base, the 201st Military Base located in Dushanbe and Bokhtar, consisting of motorised rifle, tank, artillery, reconnaissance, air defence, NBC protection and communications units.[1] Russian President Vladimir Putin also views this military base “as the key guarantor of security in Tajikistan and in the entire region.” Russia’s reason to build the military base is also to “support the Tajik government, ensure the stability of the military-political situation”[2] in addition to strengthening Russia’s presence in the Central Asian region. China, on the other hand, also built a strong military base in the country, and reports suggest that this base could be a full-scale military base near the Tajik-Afghan border and the Tajik-China border.[3] The base is in Gorno-Badakhshan province, also close to the Wakhan corridor in Afghanistan.[4]
The Russian influence in Tajikistan’s decision-making policies to ensure who operates in its territories is well fathomed considering the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), an intergovernmental military alliance between Central Asian countries: Tajikistan, Kirgizstan, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Armenia and Russia. This treaty binds Tajikistan more strongly with Russia, given the mutual defence pact.
INDIA’S OWN NAVIGATION OF POLICIES AND DIPLOMATIC GAINS
Nevertheless, whether the Ayni base would have become a strategic asset or a liability for India, should the lease be extended, given Chinese assertive muscle flexing in recent times with a full-fledged military base in the country, and Beijing sharing a common border with Tajikistan, was only time to tell. There needs to be an analysis to understand the reasons that could have catapulted the exit of India from Tajikistan. This can help us to understand whether this strategic loss was due to other strategic gains that India managed to grab during the lease phase.
One major reason why Tajikistan had to kowtow to China’s apprehensions was probably following the Dokhlam standoff in 2016 and the Galwan standoff in 2020. In addition, the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG) waiver for India by the United States and not for Pakistan could have been another thorn that resulted in Chinese apprehensions. In addition, India also signed the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) in 2018 facilitating “access to advanced defence systems and enabling India to optimally utilise its existing U.S. origin platforms.”[5] In 2019, both countries also signed the Industrial Security Agreement (ISA) to facilitate the exchange of classified information between the defence industries of both the countries.”[6]
In 2018, India also signed a reciprocal logistics support deal with France that would provide both the armed forces “logistical support, supplies and services from each other during authorised port visits, joint exercises, joint training, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts.”[7]
This is also a period when India has been vehement on its decisions to sell defence technologies to countries that do not share cordial relations with Beijing. This includes even the sale of BrahMos cruise missiles to Southeast Asian countries like the Philippines and Vietnam. In recent times, India’s weapons sales to such states challenge Beijing’s ‘string of pearls’ strategy against India. Most importantly, this was also a period when the region of Asia Pacific was slowly altering its identity to an Indo-Pacific group, a notion that China detest.
While many view such bases as means to leverage its strategic advantage vis-à-vis Pakistan, it would have been a matter of time to see whether Tajikistan would have allowed India to carry out any strategically motivated activities from its territory if it had extended the lease for a task that had already been over, that is, to renovate the base. The other purpose to support and assist the Afghan Northern Alliance is also settled with the return of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and India’s own manoeuvring of diplomacy with the new governance system.
A military base in a region could also result in Tajikistan’s own demands from India to fulfil its security imperatives, as it has done with China, for instance, an agreement between China and Tajikistan to construct border outposts on the Tajik-Afghan border, command centres, border service checkpoints and training centres.[8] These demands could become difficult for India to fulfil amid its own burgeoning relations with Tajikistan’s neighbours. In 2021, Russia sent “three motorised rifle battalions have been completely re-equipped with modern BMP-2M and BTR-82A combat equipment, anti-aircraft units have received new and all-weather Willow complexes, Kornet anti-tank guided missile systems, ASVK-M Cord sniper rifles, AK-12 assault rifles, high-range and power rocket infantry flamethrowers and equipment of logistics and technical support services.”[9]
In addition, in 2022, Tajikistan participated in military drills with other CSTO members in Tajikistan near the Afghan border, engaging artillery systems and rocket launchers, strengthening its alliance with Russia further.[10] Also, many reports claim that Russian troops stationed in the Tajik base were redeployed to Ukraine, though such reports were not confirmed officially.[11] These developments in Tajikistan may not have catapulted to a positive diplomatic ambience for India, which follows a Non Alignment policy. India is a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), but India also participates in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD). [12]
THE SILVER LINING
India’s influence, though humble as compared to China and Russia, has grown in Central Asia over the past few years through the Connect Central Asia Policy, which could be viewed by Beijing as a direct challenge to its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). India has provided weapons systems to Central Asian countries like Armenia to strengthen the Armenian military. In 2020, Armenia chose India’s indigenously developed Swathi Weapons Locating Radar (WLR) over Russian and Polish radars in a USD forty million deal with India.[13] In 2022, India also signed defence deal to supply Armenia with the Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launcher (MBRL). These deals provide India with an opportunity to enter into the Caucasus region without military presence in the region.[14]
In 2011, India signed nuclear energy cooperation agreement with Kazakhstan following a memorandum of understanding (MoU) signed in 2009, and Kazakhstan is an important supplier of uranium for India’s nuclear power plants. [15] Ironically, China also considers Kazakhstan a crucial partner for supplying uranium.[16] In 2019, India also signed a deal with Uzbekistan to supply uranium for India’s nuclear power plants,[17] and there is a long-term agreement between China and Uzbekistan to supply uranium. These positive developments that help India exert its influence in Central Asia likely may not have been viewed in a positive light by other competitors in the region.
In addition, India’s strategic relations with Tajikistan have grown in the past few years with India also sharing a long-term agreement with Tajikistan to secure uranium. India also imports aluminium from Tajikistan’s TALCO smelter. [18]
Prior to the year of India’s withdrawal from the Ayni base, India’s trade turnover in 2020-2021 with Tajikistan was fifty two percent more than what it was in 2019-2020.[19] India also plans to focus on ties with Tajikistan, which would provide a financial boost to the Indian economy. This is evident from India’s 2021 venture of exploring hydropower cooperation with Tajikistan when India’s Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited (BHEL) signed an agreement with Tajikistan’s Ministry of Energy and Industry to set up a 100 MW Hydro Electric Power Plant.[20] These developments led to further strengthening of cooperation in recent times.
WAPCOS is also an Indian company which, in 2024, focused on strengthening cooperation in the hydro power sector, infrastructural projects, and implementing the CASA-100 project.[21] India is also diligently working to strengthen its cooperation in the digital economy sector. India is also actively participating in integrating digital tools in Tajikistan’s education sector. There is also cooperation to strengthen ties in the field of small and medium enterprises through an MoU between Tajikistan’s Ministry of Industry and New Technologies and the National Small Industries Corporation Limited of India.[22]
The focus now should be to mitigate the limitations of difficulties in transit by increasing focus on the North-South Transport Corridor (NSTC). Tajikistan is also in talks with Iran to gain access to Chabahar port, which has been developed with assistance from India.[23] There is also a focus on increasing flight frequencies between India and Tajikistan to boost tourism between the two countries.
CONCLUSION
Diplomacy is not a static process. The success of diplomacy is dependent on a holistic development and improvement of events that strengthen ties between two states but such developments must not overlook the problems and concerns that could build up should there be any proceedings on the same. India and Tajikistan share a longstanding strategic partnership rooted in historical ties, shared security concerns, and geographical proximity via Afghanistan. Tajikistan has consistently been India’s closest partner in Central Asia, especially in defence and counter-terrorism cooperation. The absence of an Indian military footprint at Ayni highlights the structural challenges India faces in Central Asian geopolitics and underscores the need for a comprehensive diplomatic overhaul to preserve its identity as a significant regional partner. The recalibration of India’s military engagement with Tajikistan towards training programs, joint exercises, information sharing, and capacity building rather than basing, could be considered as a good start for the time being, but India’s greater strategic role should be to foster regional engagement to invite opportunities for collaborations and shared security access to ensure India’s long-term strategic goals, especially in contrast to growing Chinese influence in Asia.
[1] “The Russian Military Base in Tajikistan Has Undergone a Combat Readiness Inspection,” PACSTO, January 31, 2024, <The Russian Military Base in Tajikistan Has Undergone a Combat Readiness Inspection>
[2] “Putin calls Russia’s 201st military base in Tajikistan key guarantor of security,” TASS, October 9, 2025, <Putin calls Russia’s 201st military base in Tajikistan key guarantor of security – Russian Politics & Diplomacy – TASS>
[3] Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, “Beijing promises joint facility, but builds full army base in Tajikistan,” The Economic Times, July 16, 2024, <China Tajikistan: Beijing promises joint facility, but builds full army base in Tajikistan – The Economic Times>
[4] Stephen Blank, “China’s Military Base in Tajikistan: What Does It Mean?, Central Asia Caucasus Analyst, April 18, 2019, <China’s Military Base in Tajikistan: What Does it Mean?>
[5] “Joint Statement on the Inaugural India-U.S 2+2 Ministerial Dialogues,” Ministry of External Affairs, September 6, 2018, <Joint Statement on the Inaugural India-U.S 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue>
[6] “India and US to set-up joint working group in defence industrial security,” Ministry of Defence, October 1, 2021, <Press Release:Press Information Bureau>
[7] Huma Siddiqui, “India-France operationalise their Logistics Support Agreement,” Financial Express, January 25, 2019, <India-France operationalise their Logistics Support Agreement – Business News | The Financial Express>
[8] “China stepping up military cooperation with Tajikistan,” Eurasianet, November 22, 2022, <China stepping up military cooperation with Tajikistan | Eurasianet>
[9] “The Russian military in Tajikistan sent new tankto the mountain range,” VPK News, December 13, 2021, <The Russian military in Tajikistan sent new tanks to the mountain range – ВПК.name>
[10] “Moscow-led bloc to engage over 100 artillery guns in Tajikistan drills near Afghan border,” TASS, October 18, 2021, <Moscow-led bloc to engage over 100 artillery guns in Tajikistan drills near Afghan border – Military & Defense – TASS>
[11] “’Up To 1500’ Russian Troops Redeployed to Ukraine From Tajik Base, Investigation Reveals,” RFERL, September 14, 2022, <‘Up To 1,500’ Russian Troops Redeployed To Ukraine From Tajik Base, Investigation Reveals>
[12] “Australia Joins India, Japan, And U.S. For Major Quad Naval Drill, Exercise Malabar 2025,” News On Air, November 12, 2025, <Australia Joins India, Japan, and U.S. for Major Quad Naval Drill, Exercise Malabar 2025>
[13] “India Set to Export Swathi Weapon Locating Radar to Another Nation Following Armenia deal,” Indian Defence Research Wing, July 16, 2025, <India Set to Export Swathi Weapon Locating Radar to Another Nation Following Armenia Deal – Indian Defence Research Wing>
[14] “India starts exporting Pinaka weapon systems to Armenia,” The Economic Times, November 25, 2024,< India starts exporting Pinaka weapon systems to Armenia – The Economic Times>
[15] “India-Kazakhstan nuclear cooperation agreement signed,” World Nuclear News, April 18, 2011, <India-Kazakhstan nuclear cooperation agreement signed – World Nuclear News>
[16] Marina Gruzer, “China Deepens Strategic Partnerships at the Central Asia Summit,” Bloomsbury Intelligence and Security Institute, July 11, 2025, <China Deepens Strategic Partnerships at the Central Asia Summit — Bloomsbury Intelligence and Security Institute (BISI)>
[17] “India, Uzbekistan explore strategic energy ties with focus on coal gasification, clean technologies,” India Blooms News Service, August 4, 2025, <India, Uzbekistan explore strategic energy ties with focus on coal gasification, clean technologies | Indiablooms – First Portal on Digital News Management>
[18] “Central Asia Deepens Trade Links with India Amid Growing Economic Ties,” The Times of Central Asia, September 18, 2025, <Central Asia Deepens Trade Links with India Amid Growing Economic Ties – The Times Of Central Asia>
[19] “Economic and trade cooperation, investment attraction,” Embassy of the Republic of Tajikistan In The Republic of India,” May 29, 2021, <Economic and trade cooperation, investment attraction | Embassy of the Republic of Tajikistan in the Republic of India>
[20] “BHEL Signs MoU with Govt. of Tajikistan for setting up a 100MW Hydro-Electric Power Project in the Republic of Tajikistan,” BHEL, <BHEL Signs MoU with Govt. of Tajikistan for setting up a 100 MW Hydro-Electric Power Project in the Republic of Tajikistan | Official Website of Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited, New Delhi, India>
[21] “Indian Wapcos set to take hydrocarbon co-work with Tajikistan to next level,” Turkic World, September 4, 2024, <Indian Wapcos set to take hydropower co-work with Tajikistan to next level – TurkicWorld>
[22] “Tajikistan and India agree to cooperate in the field of industry,” Kazinform International News Agency, October 31, 2024, <Tajikistan and India agree to cooperate in the field of industry>
[23] Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, “Tajikistan begins talks with Iran over use of Chabahar port,” The Economic Times, January 24, 2025, <Tajikistan begins talks with Iran over use of Chabahar port – The Economic Times>
