Article by Debalina Ghoshal
Alliances are partnerships with pledge to support military aspirations that are multilateral in nature are no longer confined to NATO but such alliances and partnerships are also extending to the West Asian part of the world up to South Asian periphery. One such alliance is the Mecca Defence Alliance, also known as the Mecca Pact between Pakistan, Turkey, and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, signed in 2026 that vouches to support military aspirations of member states. To be precise, support for military aspirations means that member states may also choose to participate in fulfilling geo-strategic aspirations of each other so as to strengthen their geo-economic stance.
The Badr MoU, a non-binding formal arrangement, could be viewed as an extension of the Mecca Defence Alliance and aims to strengthen military complexes of participatory states. The agreement is signed between Turkey, Pakistan, Qatar, and Indonesia.
This is a crucial and important move by the alliance states. Once alliance is formed, it could be difficult to rely on foreign powers for weapon systems that would be crucial to deterrence as well as combat capabilities. Once states are involved in defence technology transfer and co-development of weapon systems, they could be lured into defence partnerships and alliance agreements. Nevertheless, this article aims to understand this agreement through an unbiased prism in order to contribute to the best possible way towards strategic stability in the region. This means that the brief makes attempts to highlight how the agreement could indirectly benefit India as well as draw out the concerns for New Delhi’s future choices.
Badr Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)
On October 2026, Pakistan’s Foreign Office spokesperson Sajjad Haider Khan announced that Islamabad had ratified the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement. Saudi Arabia has also ratified the Agreement. Signatories to alliance formations must ratify the same agreement to make such agreements come into fruition. Despite the alliance being a tripartite one, each of the countries reportedly will be following their own constitutional and legal procedures to approve international agreements. Saudi Arabia has also ratified the Pact, while Turkey’s ratification process is undergoing parliamentary review. Amid these developments, Badr MoU has also caught the attention of the international order. As mentioned already, this agreement signed in October 2026 in Doha, Qatar, includes Turkey, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Qatar.
The MoU is believed to bolster financial support from Qatar and defence technology transfer through co-development and joint production thus making efforts to make countries like Pakistan and Indonesia defence manufacturing hubs boosting economy.
Weapon systems are akin to a state’s own geographical and weather conditions in addition to its own combat requirements. Hence, states seek joint production and co-development of weapon systems. It helps to set up industries, both direct defence industries as well as those industries that supply supplementary and complementary systems to complete the weapon systems. This provides a scope for setting up industrial hub generating employment opportunities. The ratification of the Mecca Pact solidifies efforts to strengthen defence cooperation through establishments of defence industries and provision of financial support.
The Badr MoU could be viewed as one of the first steps towards ensuring the operationalisation of the Mecca Pact. The Mecca Pact focuses on collective defence and deterrence, and the Badr Agreement would aim to strengthen this. The signatories of the Mecca Pact will have their respective customers for weapons sale, and hence, looping them in the Badr MoU makes the Mecca Pact more convenient. For instance, Turkey, whose ratification process is undergoing parliamentary review, has an agreement with Indonesia in 2025 that the latter would purchase forty-eight KAAN fighter aircraft from Ankara It is reported to be the largest defence agreement in the history of the Republic. The agreement also ensures that a “comprehensive model” would be established, including local manufacturing capabilities and training support. Indonesia has also been keen on Pakistan’s JF-17 aircraft.
Saudi Arabia Absence
Nevertheless, one of the three signatories in the Mecca Pact that has not signed the Badr Agreement is Saudi Arabia. This is probably because Saudi Arabia may be apprehensive of such agreements on joint production and co-development of weapon systems that could bound it to buy weapon systems from Turkey rather than looking towards its partners in the West. Saudi Arabia is keen to strengthen its defence mechanism and avail of capabilities through alliances that could help protect its territories at this moment of crisis. However, it is not keen to annoy the West or limit its choices of availing advanced weapon systems.
Interestingly, despite the strengthened bonhomie between France and Saudi Arabia in the past few years, Riyadh has also refrained from making any advances in the purchase of French Dassault’s Rafale aircraft. In fact, in September 2026, the US Department of State has approved of possible foreign military sale (FMS) to Riyadh for their purchase of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and related equipment. Moreover, in the Mecca Pact, Saudi Arabia would act as a financier. Riyadh may not be willing to finance to support defence industrial opportunities of other countries in the region or beyond. Riyadh is working towards Vision 2030 with a core goal of localising fifty per cent of its military equipment spending. Its missile factories have been expanding recently for building larger solid-fueled ballistic missiles to fly farther and carry heavier load. Airpower will be subjected to air defence interception by adversaries. Scope of intercepting high-speed ballistic missiles would be less compared to aircraft.
In addition, Saudi is probably hopeful of the Mecca Pact having to become a short-term agreement until the threat from the Houthis and Iran persists. To add to this, both Pakistan and Turkey do not hold cordial relations with Israel, while over the years, Riyadh’s relations with Israel have flourished. Israel is also reported to be assisting Saudi Arabia to provide capabilities to assist its military operations against Houthis.
However, all these predictions are too early to be embedded under analytic purview. Considering that Field Marshal Asim Munir of Pakistan is playing his role to the best of his capability to ensure the success of the Badr Agreement, there could be possibility that he is able to win Saudi’s trust and convince them to join this agreement as well.
Should India be Worried?
India’s concern with the Badr MoU should be a possible scope of losing markets to sell off its weapon systems in the near future. In addition, it would be selling its weapon capabilities to the countries where Pakistan or Turkey could also be selling to. India will be selling BrahMos and Astra missiles to Indonesia, while the latter is actively taking interest in JF-17 aircraft of Pakistan. Indonesia is also in agreement with Turkey for KAAN aircraft. Badr affects India’s defence export market rather than its military deterrence.
In the near future, such MoUs could also attract investments and opportunities from Western defence hubs providing impetus to Badr members. Indonesia is a key defence partner of France while Turkey and Germany, both NATO countries have started to expand their defence cooperation in the recent past. Pakistan-US ties under General Asim Munir have strengthened in recent times post 2025.
France has strengthened its defence cooperation in October 2026 with Qatar. Nevertheless, a strengthened defence industrial complex means modern weapon systems that could directly challenge India’s deterrence. Advanced drone capabilities from foreign powers involved in active surveillance across Indian borders make border management more complex and challenging for India.
Conclusion
India must persistently focus on improving its counter-terrorism strategies to prevent conflict or a war-like scenario from taking place. Thwarting asymmetric means of conflicts by taking lessons from the recent incident in France where goods like refrigerators through cyber attacks would become new challenges to reflect upon.
In addition, New Delhi must focus on a disciplined defence export mechanism taking care of making crucial weapon systems avail to states in a way that would not harm its own security and defence quotient vis-à-vis states that do not view India as friend.
References
1. “Pakistan ratifies Mecca defense pact with Türkiye, Saudi Arabia,” Yeni Safak, October 24, 2026, <Pakistan
ratifies Mecca defense pact with Türkiye, Saudi Arabia>
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4. “Turkish Aerospace and Indonesia sign official Contract for the sale of 48 KAAN Turkish Fighter in Istanbul,” Turkish Aerospace, July 26, 2025, <TURKISH AEROSPACE AND INDONESIA SIGN OFFICIAL CONTRACT FOR THE SALE OF 48 KAAN TURKISH FIGHTER IN ISTANBUL – TUSAS>
5. “Turkish Aerospace and Indonesia sign official Contract for the sale of 48 KAAN Turkish Fighter in Istanbul,” Turkish Aerospace, July 26, 2025, <TURKISH AEROSPACE AND INDONESIA SIGN OFFICIAL CONTRACT FOR THE SALE OF 48 KAAN TURKISH FIGHTER IN ISTANBUL – TUSAS>
6. “Kingdom of Saudi Arabia- F-35 Lightning Joint Strike Fighter Aircraft,” U.S. Department of State, September 17, 2026, <Kingdom of Saudi Arabia – F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter Aircraft – United States Department of State>
7. Jonathan Landay, “Saudi missile plant expansionmay produce more powerful missiles,” study says, Reuters, October 23, 2026, <EXCLUSIVE: Saudi missile plant expansion may produce more powerful missiles, study says | Reuters >
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