Disarming Weapons of Mass Destruction:The ‘South Africas’ or the ‘Libyas’?
States often pursue weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities to gain strategic advantages in deterrence equations, theoretically negating scenarios where war-fighting becomes necessary. However, WMD arsenals—encompassing not only warheads but also their delivery systems—introduce significant complexities into regional and global strategic stability. These complexities underscore the paradox of disarmament: while WMDs are acquired to deter conflict, their existence perpetuates instability, and their relinquishment carries unpredictable risks.
THE EXISTENTIAL COMPLEXITIES
The challenge of disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, must not be viewed through the narrow prism of nuclear weapons alone. In the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, for instance, efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) have repeatedly faltered, partly due to the presence of chemical and biological weapons among regional states. This dynamic illustrates how WMD disarmament must be approached holistically, as biological and chemical arsenals complicate efforts to address nuclear threats in isolation. A central dilemma arises when states consider disarming their WMD capabilities.
While disarmament may theoretically foster territorial and regional peace, the decision to relinquish such weapons can yield diametrically opposed outcomes. States risk becoming either a “South Africa”— emerging more secure and prosperous post-disarmament—or a “Libya,” where disarmament precipitates vulnerability and destabilization. The contrast between these two African nations serves as a critical case study in the risks and rewards of WMD disarmament. SOUTH AFRICA’S STRATEGIC RESTRAINT In 1989, South Africa—then clandestinely developing nuclear weapons—voluntarily abandoned its program and acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1991.
This decision enabled Pretoria to redirect resources toward economic revitalization, industrial restructuring, and democratic reforms following the end of apartheid. To facilitate verification by global nonproliferation regimes, South Africa dismantled its ballistic missile capabilities, scrapping missiles and destroying engines. Ballistic missiles, often the backbone of nuclear deterrence for states, were renounced through domestic legislation such as the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act (1993). South Africa’s disarmament was driven by a perceived absence of existential threats in its regional environment post-Cold War. With independence achieved and apartheid dismantled, the move reduced fiscal strain and redirected investments toward governance reforms and socioeconomic development. The country’s successful transition from pariah state to regional leader underscores how disarmament can align with national priorities in the absence of acute security threats.
By contrast, Libya’s decision to abandon its WMD arsenal in 2003 followed the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, a coercive context starkly different from South Africa’s voluntary pivot. Fearful of regime change, Muammar Gaddafi’s government acceded to the Additional Protocol of the NPT and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), leading to the lifting of Western sanctions and a surge in oil revenue. Tripoli also joined the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCoC), committing to dismantle missiles exceeding 300 km in range or 500 kg in payload—thresholds defining nuclear-capable systems under global nonproliferation norms. Libya’s disarmament was further motivated by the obsolescence of its Scud missile arsenal and failed attempts to modernize its medium-range capabilities. By 2011, however, the country descended into chaos after NATO-backed forces overthrew Gaddafi, transforming Libya into a battleground for proxy conflicts involving Turkey, Qatar, France, Russia, Egypt, and the UAE. This outcome starkly contrasts with South Africa’s trajectory, illustrating how externally pressured disarmament—devoid of genuine buy-in or post-disarmament security guarantees— can exacerbate instability.
LESSONS FOR NORTH KOREA, IRAN AND BEYOND
Libya’s fate profoundly influenced North Korea’s stance on disarmament. In 2018, U.S. calls for a “Libyan model” of denuclearization were met with hostility, as Pyongyang linked Gaddafi’s overthrow to his compliance with disarmament demands. North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has framed nuclear weapons as indispensable to regime survival, a view reinforced by Libya’s disintegration.
Similarly, Iran views its nuclear and missile programs as symbols of technological prowess and regional influence. The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) collapsed in part due to U.S. demands to curtail Tehran’s missile development—a capability Iran insists is solely for conventional deterrence. Moreover, Iran’s reliance on proxy forces like Hezbollah and the Houthis, which employ ballistic missiles, complicates disarmament prospects. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei has explicitly framed nuclear latency as a tool for regime survival, rejecting the “Libyan model” as a Trojan horse for Western intervention. UKRAINE AND ISRAEL: COMPLEMENTARY CASE STUDIES Ukraine’s 1994 decision to relinquish Soviet-era nuclear weapons under the Budapest Memorandum—in exchange for security guarantees from Russia, the U.S., and the UK—failed to prevent Moscow’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and 2022 invasion. This underscores the perils of trading WMD deterrence for unenforceable diplomatic assurances, particularly in regions marked by asymmetric power dynamics. Israel, an undeclared nuclear state, maintains a policy of “deliberate ambiguity” (“bombs in the basement”) to deter regional adversaries while avoiding overt proliferation. By abstaining from testing and refusing to join the CWC, Tel Aviv retains WMD flexibility. This posture has paradoxically discouraged MENA states from pursuing nuclear programs, as Israel’s latent capabilities— coupled with advanced missile arsenals—create a low-threshold deterrent equilibrium.
CONCLUSION
When states contemplate abandoning WMD, they weigh the potential for enhanced political stability and economic growth against the risks of diminished deterrence. For governments that regard WMD not only as war-fighting tools but also as symbols of prestige and instruments of foreign policy, the decision is profoundly complex. States that prioritize political and economic governance may ultimately follow the South African model—provided their security environments allow it. Those that cannot alleviate external threats, or that view WMD as essential to regime survival, may well see Libya’s tragic aftermath as a cautionary, even prohibitive, precedent.
