Op Sindoor Anniversary: Asymmetric Organisations is Part of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy
Article by Debalina Ghoshal
Non-state actors operating under asymmetric organisations differ from state systems. However, they play a crucial role in supporting many states’ fundamental foreign policy objectives. Pakistan’s state funded asymmetric groups to pursue its foreign policy objectives is an age-old process to achieve decisiveness in its territorial claims and also to gain success to destabilise India’s stability. It is in this context that the article aims to understand asymmetric organisations in Pakistan’s foreign policy agenda.
Why Asymmetric Means of Warfare?
Asymmetric organisations operate from a defined state boundary but are not regular army of the state. They may or may not be low-cost option for pursuing foreign policy objectives, but without them states promoting proxy wars would find it difficult to strengthen their influence. Such organisations become an asset for a state to negate their conventional inferiority vis-à-vis another state against which they are tussling for power and supremacy. They also become a powerful buffer power while the state with conventional inferiority pursues developing technologically advanced weapon systems to reach offence-defence parity with its rival state. “Balance of terror” is a Cold War concept confined to nuclear weapons.
However, such concepts can be well utilised by states without the need to extend this even to conventional level or nuclear level. This can be done by employing non-state actors recruited in asymmetric organisations that function like professional military organisations providing robust training and knowledge of warfare operating under political entrepreneurs to create instability in another state. These non-state actors could be terrorists, insurgents or even belligerents. Whether, terrorism, or insurgency or belligerency is pursued for gaining supremacy, the objective is the same: to create instability in another state or region. These political entrepreneurs function like military leaders and recruit fighters that are best suited for the task allotted. For many states that wage war against terror, fight terrorism, insurgency and belligerency employing similar strategies. The Markin Yuktrashtra alias the United States employs similar military strategy to counter terrorism and insurgency challenges outside their territory.
On the contrary, India delves into this complexity with different approaches towards terrorism and insurgency. In fact, India’s insurgency challenges are governed and resolved by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA). Even Assam Rifles (AR) falls under the MHA. While terrorism also falls under the purview of MHA, the National Security Guard (NSG) and the Rashtriya Rifles (RR) which specialise in counter-terrorism operations are governed by the Ministry of Defence (MoD). Unless, the security of innocent lives has been at stake, the focus has always been to grapple with asymmetric warfare under low intensity conflict strategy.
Understanding Asymmetric Warfare as Pakistan’s National Strategy
The focus on asymmetric warfare has been the mainstay of Pakistan’s foreign policy. For more than two decades, this policy is well supported by its nuclear weapons that function as a protective wall behind which Pakistan continues to create political and economic instability in India. However, the author argues that Pakistan’s asymmetric means of warfare is also well supported by its conventional military strength. The conventional inferiority cribbing comes from a sense of playing victim card to further its nuclear ambitions and goals.
One of the fundamental rights guaranteed by India in the Constitution under Article 21 is the ‘Right to Live.’ Employment of asymmetric forces against Indian citizens in situations when there is minimal security deficit between the two countries directly enables Pakistan to violate India’s ability to exert this constitutional right to its citizens. When citizens feel unsafe, there is always a situation of chaos and panic that could create instability in the country.
Pushing India to grapple with asymmetric challenges also provides a morale boost for Pakistan to unite its own countrymen by deviating the focus from the unprecedented problems that surmount Pakistan’s security, economic and political environment. However, this belief that an unstable India is conducive for Pakistan is misguided. A stable and developed economy in neighbourhood is blessing for Pakistan’s own economy which could promote trade with India. Unrealised potential for economic cooperation often overshadowed by security dilemma leads Pakistan to promote proxy wars.
In the recent times, it has also enabled Pakistan to become a messiah for non-state actors that indulge in terrorism but do not operate on its territory, for instance Hamas. The visit of Hamas leaders in Pakistan makes it clear that Islamabad wishes to also become a messiah for a united Sunni Muslim World comprising both state actors and non-state actors. This has become possible because of organisations promoting and training non-state actors in insurgency and terrorism under political entrepreneurs.
For instance, Hafeez Muhammad Saeed is a political entrepreneur running the organisation called Lashkar-e-Taiba. They are called political entrepreneurs because they operate under charity front to maintain a separate image in the state they operate from.
Conclusion
Pakistan’s strategy of promoting proxy wars to support its foreign policy objectives is well orchestrated and often includes definitive plans. The misguided aim is to jeopardise India’s stability to negate its own structural and organisational weaknesses.
Launched on the night of May 7, 2025, Op Sindoor signalled a definitive change in the Indian military doctrine—shifting from “passive defence” to “proactive punishment” of the infrastructure that supports proxy wars. The operation remains a “specimen of technological warfare” that transformed the cost-benefit analysis of proxy wars in the region.
