Bangladesh’s Unfolding Crisis and the Strategic Test for India
The worsening law-and-order situation in Bangladesh can no longer be viewed as a purely domestic challenge. What began as internal political turbulence has now evolved into a development with direct consequences for India’s security environment, regional diplomacy, and economic interests. For New Delhi, the imperative is not reactive crisis management, but a sober evaluation of the deeper forces driving instability and the formulation of responses that safeguard long-term strategic interests without inadvertently empowering hostile external actors.
The current phase of unrest was catalysed by the killing of Osman Hadi, an incident that quickly became the subject of coordinated misinformation. Islamist groups, without substantiating evidence, propagated claims that the perpetrators had fled to India — a narrative actively amplified by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence with the clear objective of externalising Bangladesh’s internal breakdown and shifting blame towards New Delhi.
Subsequent disclosures, however, undermined this version. Hadi’s brother publicly suggested the possibility of state involvement, alleging that the Yunus government may have orchestrated the murder to justify delaying elections. Other reports identified Faisal Karim Masood as a prime suspect still within Bangladesh, while yet another strand pointed to the arrest of a Lashkar-e-Taiba operative in connection with the case. The attempt to implicate India thus appears less an error of judgment and more a calculated diversion.
This pattern repeated itself in the killing of Dipu Chandra Das, a Hindu citizen whose death exposed deeper institutional decay. What reportedly began as a minor workplace dispute was swiftly reframed by Islamist radicals as an alleged religious insult, triggering mob violence. More disturbing than the violence itself was the alleged conduct of the state — police reportedly handed Dipu over to the mob and failed to intervene. Such abdication of responsibility represents a serious governance failure and raises alarms for India, given its civilisational ties and stake in Bangladesh’s internal stability.
Understanding Bangladesh’s descent into disorder requires situating these incidents within a broader geopolitical realignment since August 2024. Both Pakistan and China have systematically expanded their engagement with Dhaka during this period of political fragility. January 2025 alone saw separate visits by senior ISI officials and Pakistani trade delegations. This momentum continued with Pakistan’s foreign secretary visiting Dhaka in April, followed by Muhammad Yunus’s China visit in March to deepen foreign policy coordination.
The trajectory culminated in a trilateral meeting involving the foreign secretaries of Pakistan, China, and Bangladesh in Kunming on June 19, 2025. Around the same time, BNP delegations travelled to China, and later that year Pakistan’s commerce minister and deputy prime minister visited Bangladesh to sign multiple agreements. These engagements collectively indicate a pattern of strategic convergence rather than isolated diplomatic exchanges.
This external alignment has unfolded alongside internal political paralysis. The Yunus administration has appeared either unable or unwilling to stabilise governance while repeatedly deferring elections. This context lends weight to Pakistan Army Chief Asim Munir’s provocative assertion that India would face threats from the eastern direction. Simultaneously, Bangladesh’s media ecosystem has come under sustained pressure, with journalists operating under intimidation, further shrinking democratic space ahead of elections scheduled for February 12, 2026.
Notably, Jamaat-e-Islami has gained disproportionate influence without electoral participation, benefiting from prolonged interim arrangements. The return of Tarique Rahman in December 2025 after nearly two decades in exile has added another layer of political complexity, with the BNP remaining the most organised grassroots force. Surveys suggesting that nearly 70 per cent of Bangladeshis want the Awami League included in elections underline a broader public desire for political pluralism rather than exclusionary governance.
Against this backdrop, India’s response must be carefully calibrated. New Delhi possesses multiple levers — from reconsidering its Rs 120 crore budgetary allocation and restricting electricity supply and cotton exports, to diplomatic downgrades and trade recalibration. Bilateral trade currently stands at $13.5 billion, heavily skewed in India’s favour, offering economic leverage.
Yet the central challenge is not the availability of options, but their strategic sequencing. Excessively punitive actions risk driving Bangladesh deeper into the Pakistan–China orbit, while passivity could embolden anti-India elements and normalise violence against minorities. India must therefore balance firmness on core concerns — particularly security and minority protection — with sustained engagement aimed at preserving democratic pathways.
The growing trilateral nexus between Pakistan, China, and Bangladesh presents a long-term challenge for India’s eastern flank, with implications for border security and proxy conflict. Navigating this environment will require strategic patience, measured pressure, and a clear-eyed assessment of how best to protect India’s interests without accelerating adverse alignments.
