Lashkar-e-Taiba’s ‘Water Force’: A Renewed Maritime Terror Threat to India

Article by Dr Kanchan Lakshmman

In a development that echoes the 2008 Mumbai attacks, the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) has established a 135-member maritime unit called “Water Force” trained specifically for marine-based terror operations targeting India. Recent video evidence from LeT commanders has revealed a training network that includes scuba diving, high-speed maritime operations, and sub-surface warfare, indicating an improvement in the group’s capabilities and thus posing a renewed challenge to India’s maritime security.

LeT’s current focus on its ‘Water Force’ builds on its long history of amphibious training, ranging from combat diving at Neelam River to aquatic infrastructure disguised as fish farms at Muridke (Punjab, Pakistan) and facilities at Mangla and Tarbela Dams, with support from Pakistan’s establishment. Historically, Lashkar cadres have received combat diving training from the Al Dawa Water Training Unit under the Falah-e-Insaniyat Foundation (a banned Lashkar proxy) at the Neelam River near Muzaffarabad, Kotli, and Mangla Dam, to enable infiltration across the Kishanganga River from the Tangdhar Sector. The group has also operated advanced marine training sites on the Karachi coast, lakes near Ambhor Mohajir Camp in Muzaffarabad, and acquired land in Sindh’s Thatta district, underscoring its sustained investment in maritime capabilities for India-specific operations.

LeT’s Maritime Ambitions

Recent video footage reveals direct evidence of Pakistan-sponsored terrorism, with LeT commanders openly discussing their maritime terror ambitions. Haris Dar, Deputy Secretary General of Pakistan Markazi Muslim League (PMML, LeT’s political wing), is seen inspecting trainees and detailing maritime training programmes. The video constitutes a rare instance of a senior LeT commander admitting, on camera, to training operations, thus validating existing intelligence of Pakistan’s support for cross-border terrorism. The viral video shows Haris Dar describing specialised training programmes, including scuba diving, swimming, high-speed boat handling and social media operations. Haris conducts a roll-call for 135 operatives trained in maritime combat, admitting that programmes in three tehsils specifically focused on boat operations. This kind of training infrastructure is indicative of Lashkar’s attempt for ingress into India through vulnerable aquatic corridors.

On December 28, 2025, the group held a workshop near the Sutlej River, upstream of the Pallah barrage in Pakistan, under the supervision of senior PMML leader Baber Bhai, a close associate of LeT’s deputy chief and mastermind of the Pahalgam attack, Saifullah Kasuri. A three-day follow-up session in January 2026 was postponed, but Baber Bhai continues to train recruits in deep-water activities at Pallah with support from the Pakistani establishment. In addition, LeT’s front organisation Al Ihya Water Rescue, active for over five years in Hasilpur and Bahawalpur, runs a training network involving scuba divers, swimmers and speed boats, camouflaged as humanitarian rescue and boat-handling workshops.

Modus Operandi

LeT’s modus operandi has evolved from the 26/11 template while incorporating enhanced capabilities. Its maritime terror strategy, which combines specialised skill sets like scuba diving, underwater operations and high-speed boat handling with multi-domain training in martial arts, endurance and first aid, is indicative of a professionalised approach and assistance from Pakistani forces, especially from Musa Company, the amphibious unit of the Special Services Group. Apart from targeted attacks, LeT is preparing its cadres for reconnaissance of barrages and riverine infrastructure, low-cost sabotage with high downstream impact, swimmer-assisted infiltration to bypass land security grids and logistics movement via rivers to support sleeper cells. Lashkar’s selection of Sutlej–Pallah Barrage as a training site is to exploit strategic nuances of riverine warfare, as barrage zones resemble real-world targets like headworks, bridges, and canals, and the controlled waters offer a safe setting for repeatable drills.

Presence of scuba-trained operatives indicates underwater approaches, potentially targeting naval vessels, port infrastructure or sabotage operations against underwater cables and pipelines. OSINT indicates the use of advanced equipment such as semi-submersible technology for stealth missions. A unique aspect is the integration of social media, likely used for reconnaissance, recruitment and propaganda. LeT’s trainers are embedded in its political wing, PMML, and are legitimised by radical clerics, who use the youth in humanitarian causes, thus providing plausible deniability.

Potential Targets

India’s 11098.81 km coastline is a large asymmetrical front where complete surveillance is not possible. There are a few gaps, as evidenced in the 26/11 attack, and it is not easy to monitor each and every possible landing spot in the nine States and four Union Territories. Based on Lashkar’s historical patterns and strategic objectives of Pakistan’s terror network, the following are assessed to be potential targets:

Jammu and Kashmir: LeT is likely to utilise trans-boundary waterways for infiltration. The Chenab and Jhelum rivers can be exploited since fencing these waterways is difficult. Trained terrorists may target bridges on important arterial roads and highways for speedy escape routes.

Punjab: River and lake systems along the border with Pakistan provide avenues for infiltration, particularly during the monsoon when water-level detection is tricky. Ranjit Sagar dam is vulnerable as “LeT frogmen” can try to bypass surface-level security to target towers and dam gates, impacting NH 44 connectivity, northern military logistical systems and electric supplies. Maritime capability of the LeT in a Post-Indus Waters Treaty scenario can be used to exploit infrastructure to escalate conflict.

Coastal Cities: They face a dual threat of high-speed launches targeting commercial hubs like Mumbai and Jamnagar, and tactical riverine infiltration. Mumbai remains a symbolic high-value target given its multiple landing points and high coastal populace which are attack vectors for the LeT. However, hardened security arrangements post-26/11 might influence LeT to attack softer coastal targets.

Gujarat: Proximity to Pakistan’s maritime border creates vulnerability, especially of critical infrastructure, including Kandla and Mundra ports, chemical & petroleum facilities, and religious sites like Dwarka.

Goa: Despite its distance from Pakistan, Goa is vulnerable as a soft target due to international tourism and multiple beach landing points. This aligns with the global trend of coastal tourist destinations becoming targets for maritime strikes, recently exemplified by the Bondi Beach terror attack in late 2025.

Naval Installations: Karwar and Kochi naval bases, anchoring western and southern maritime defence, are vulnerable to LeT’s specialised underwater sabotage.

Andaman and Nicobar Islands: Remote location and fragmented geography make total surveillance difficult. Past (2017) intelligence revealed LeT attack plans involving cadres infiltrating from Myanmar’s Irrawaddy district disguised as poachers, using uninhabited isles as hideouts and exploiting illegal immigrant networks in the North, Middle, and Little Andaman districts.

Prognosis

Lashkar-e-Taiba’s aggressive maritime posture reflects, to some extent, a strategic shift recently articulated by Saifullah Kasuri. The catalyst for this shift is the losses Lashkar’s aerial and land-based infrastructure suffered during Operation Sindoor. After their emphasis on drone operations in 2025, LeT is now pivoting toward maritime warfare. Kasuri recently leveraged Lashkar’s ‘Prince of the Skies’ (Fizaon ka Shehzada) claim to pivot toward a new strategic objective for 2026: achieving marine capacities under the moniker ‘Prince of the Seas’ (Samundaron ka Shehzada).

Terror groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba, with assistance from Pakistan’s establishment, continue to train their cadre for carrying out Samundari Jihad (seaborne jihad) against India. LeT’s declaration of 2026 as the year to “rule the seas” underscores that its marine wing is not a rhetorical threat but a systematic plan to exploit vulnerabilities across India’s coastline. The evolution of Lashkar’s ‘Water Force’ reflects a calculated expansion of Pakistan‑sponsored terrorism, building on past efforts while adapting to new security realities. Brazen on‑camera confessions further expose the terror infrastructure in Pakistan, reinforcing India’s long‑standing evidence at international forums and highlighting the need of countering this maritime jihad.

Views are those of the author(s).