Article by Dr Sreoshi Sinha
A new defence pact has brought Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye closer on security, with Bangladesh now considering joining the arrangement. At the same time, a recent United Nations assessment has warned that Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) is seeking to establish operational networks in Bangladesh, while terrorist violence continues in South Kashmir. These developments may appear separate, but together they point to a significant shift in the security environment surrounding India.
These developments have emerged from very different contexts. Still, together they raise a question India can no longer afford to treat as a distant possibility: is the security environment around India becoming increasingly networked?
For decades, India’s security concerns in South Asia have been understood largely through geography. Pakistan and Kashmir constituted the principal western security theatre; Bangladesh, the Northeast and the Bay of Bengal formed the eastern one. Terrorism was similarly viewed largely through the lens of infiltration, territorial sanctuaries and identifiable militant organisations.
That framework is becoming increasingly inadequate.
The emerging challenge lies in the interaction between shifting state alignments and increasingly flexible transnational networks. The significance of Bangladesh lies precisely at this intersection.
Bangladesh and the Changing Strategic Equation
The Makkah Joint Defence Agreement, signed by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye, has introduced a new framework for defence cooperation. Bangladesh’s positive interest in joining the arrangement adds an important South Asian dimension to it and deserves attention because of what it could mean for the strategic geography surrounding India.
Dhaka has its own strategic calculations. Bangladesh is seeking wider diplomatic and strategic options, and its engagement with Pakistan should be understood within that broader search for strategic space. Yet geography makes Bangladesh different from many other countries entering new partnerships. It shares a long border with India, is central to connectivity with the Northeast and occupies a crucial position in the Bay of Bengal.
A deeper Bangladesh–Pakistan defence relationship would therefore have consequences beyond the bilateral relationship itself. Military training, intelligence exchanges, defence technology, strategic consultations and institutional cooperation
could gradually create new forms of connectivity across India’s eastern and western neighbourhoods.
This is where the development deserves careful attention in New Delhi.
The question is not simply whether Bangladesh joins a particular arrangement. The real question is what kind of strategic relationships emerge after it does.
For India, this is a significant shift in the regional environment. Pakistan has traditionally been viewed as India’s principal western security challenge, while Bangladesh has largely been approached as an important eastern neighbour. Greater strategic connectivity between the two could make this geographical separation increasingly difficult to sustain.
The AQIS Factor
The security implications become sharper when Bangladesh’s changing strategic environment is considered alongside the recent UN Security Council assessment concerning AQIS.
The assessment indicates that AQIS is seeking to exploit Bangladesh for establishing operational cells and developing networks. This is significant because it reflects the changing nature of transnational terrorism.
Contemporary terrorist organisations increasingly operate through small cells, dispersed recruitment, digital communication, financial networks and flexible logistical structures. Their effectiveness does not depend solely on controlling territory or maintaining large militant formations.
This creates a different kind of security problem.
A country can pursue legitimate foreign-policy and defence partnerships while extremist organisations simultaneously attempt to exploit its social, geographical and technological connectivity. The two processes operate independently, but they can produce consequences within the same security environment.
For India, Bangladesh’s importance therefore extends beyond conventional bilateral relations. Any attempt by a transnational terrorist organisation to build operational networks there has implications for India because of Bangladesh’s proximity, connectivity and location.
The concern is consequently about opportunity. Where do terrorist organisations find space to recruit? Where can they move money and people?
Where can they develop support networks? Where can they exploit digital platforms?
Where can they take advantage of political or institutional vulnerabilities?
These questions are increasingly as important as the question of where terrorist camps are located.
Kashmir Offers an Important Warning
South Kashmir demonstrates why this change in terrorism matters.
Years of counter-terrorism operations have significantly altered the operating environment for militant organisations. Yet terrorist violence has continued, often through smaller groups, targeted killings, local recruitment, infiltration and support networks.
The lesson is straightforward: terrorism can survive better by becoming smaller, more dispersed and more difficult to detect.
This changes the nature of the counter-terrorism challenge. Eliminating armed cadres remains essential, but it addresses only one part of the problem. Terrorist organisations depend upon wider ecosystems of recruitment, ideology, financing, communication and logistics.
The Kashmir experience therefore provides India with an important warning for the wider region. Terrorist networks can adapt when conventional methods of operation become difficult. They can reduce their physical footprint while preserving their ability to recruit, communicate and strike.
This is precisely why the reported attempts by AQIS to establish networks in Bangladesh deserve attention.
Bangladesh and Kashmir are different theatres. Their terrorist organisations, political circumstances and operational histories cannot simply be equated. But both demonstrate a common feature of contemporary terrorism: the ability of networks to adapt to changing security conditions.
From Borders to Networks
This brings us to the larger transformation.
India’s security architecture has traditionally been organised around territory. Borders identify threats, military deployments protect territory, and bilateral relations define strategic competition.
Terrorist networks operate differently.
They move through connections rather than clearly defined territories—connections involving people, money, ideology, technology, communication and logistics.
This does not make geography irrelevant. Geography remains crucial. But geography now interacts with networks.
Bangladesh’s location matters because of its connectivity.
Pakistan’s importance matters because of its strategic relationships and its role in the Kashmir conflict.
Kashmir matters because it remains an established theatre of terrorism. AQIS matters because its organisational logic is transnational.
The security challenge emerges when these different forms of connectivity begin to overlap.
The Pakistan–Bangladesh Dimension
Pakistan is therefore an important variable in understanding the changing regional picture.
Its strategic significance for India is already well established through Kashmir and cross-border terrorism. Its emerging relationship with Bangladesh introduces a different dimension.
For Pakistan, closer engagement with Bangladesh expands its diplomatic and strategic reach in South Asia. For Bangladesh, engagement with Pakistan can provide additional strategic options. For India, however, the development potentially connects two security theatres that have traditionally been considered separately.
That does not automatically amount to the formation of an anti-India bloc.
The more immediate concern is the creation of new institutional and strategic linkages around India.
This is precisely why India should pay attention to the substance of these relationships rather than their political symbolism. The development of defence cooperation, intelligence sharing, military training and strategic coordination would carry far greater significance than diplomatic statements alone.
The Larger Warning for India
The most important lesson from these developments is that India may be entering a security environment where the threat does not arrive from one direction or through one organisation.
It can emerge through the interaction of several developments: a new defence relationship here, a terrorist network there, a persistent conflict elsewhere.
None of these developments needs to be centrally coordinated to affect India.
That is what makes the emerging situation more difficult, and potentially more dangerous.
The Makkah framework represents a changing pattern of strategic alignment. Bangladesh’s possible participation could deepen that change. The AQIS assessment points to the continuing geographical adaptability of transnational terrorism. South Kashmir demonstrates the resilience of terrorist networks under sustained security pressure.
Together, they suggest that India’s security map is becoming a map of networks as much as a map of borders.
The policy implication is therefore larger than simply strengthening one border or monitoring one terrorist organisation. India needs to identify emerging connections before they become security vulnerabilities.
The central question for New Delhi should be:
Where are the new strategic and terrorist networks forming around India, how might they connect with existing security theatres, and what can be done before those connections acquire operational significance?
India has considerable advantages in dealing with this emerging challenge: geography, intelligence capabilities, diplomatic reach and established relationships across the region. The critical requirement is to use these advantages early.
Conclusion
The warning signs are visible. The greater risk for India would be to wait for them to become a pattern before responding.
For India, the priority must therefore be to recognise these emerging connections early. Bangladesh’s strategic choices require close attention, alongside sustained diplomatic and security engagement with Dhaka. At the same time, counter-terrorism in Kashmir must increasingly focus on the wider networks that sustain terrorism, alongside the militants who carry out attacks.
The larger lesson is clear: India’s security map can no longer be drawn along borders alone; it must also be understood through the networks that cross them. Strategic partnerships, terrorist organisations, financial channels, digital spaces and human networks are becoming increasingly interconnected.
India’s strategic advantage will lie in identifying these connections before they harden into operational vulnerabilities.
